The Electronic Commerce Act, 2000 was introduced to ensure that consumers and businesses could engage in e-commerce easily and securely. Outline the main provisions of the act and critically analyse its objective.
The Electronic commerce act has two simple functions:
1) To provide for the legal recognition of Electronic contracts
2) To implement the EU directive on electronic signatures
Legal recognition of Electronic contracts
The electronic commerce act 2000 primary concerns itself with legally
facilitating electronic transactions. The act was put in place to address the apparent
deficiencies in existing legislation, which made frequent references to paper-based
requirements and postage of documents. The act clearly specifies that electronic
communications are now sufficient. The act defines an electronic contact as “A
contract concluded wholly or partly by means of an electronic communication”.
But was this act completely necessary? Previous precedent states that the
contract is concluded when the offeror receives the acceptance, however in cases
where the communication is instantaneous then the postal rule does not apply and
contracts are concluded as soon as notice of acceptance is received (Entores Ltd Vs
Miles Far East Corporation [1955]). So this fits exactly into the architecture under
which electronic commerce is carried out. In Part 2 of the act, clause 10 states that the
electronic commerce act will not allow breech any other laws. In the UK, all
legislation was painfully reviewed to ensure that it was applicable to electronic
commerce; the Irish electronic commerce act was put in place to avoid this work.
One major and very serious flaw in the act is that the act indicates that a
person may be bound by an e-mail that has not yet come to their attention. (For
example: in cases where people do not regularly check their e-mail).
The Electronic commerce Act 2000 did not implement the European Union’s
electronic commerce directive. This was only put into place in February 2003. These
new Regulations provide for the free movement of Information Society services
within the European Economic Area. These are essentially services (as distinct from
products) provided 'on-line' between one Member State and another.
Electronic signatures are exactly what their name indicates, electronic
identification and authentication; however, more specifically electronics must have
1) They must be uniquely linked to the signatory
2) They must be capable of identifying the signatory
3) They must be created using means that are capable of being maintained by
the signatory under his or her sole control
4) They must be linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that
any subsequent change of the data is detectable
So, an electronic signature is not something automatically applied to electronic
communications (though obviously e-mail could be set up in this way). Also, they
cannot be a simple signature image or piece of text. The electronic signature must
used to digitally sign the content of the communication. So, systems like PGP (Pretty
Good Privacy) or any PKI (Public Key Infrastructure, e.g. Verisign) system that
allows for the encoding and decoding of information, or even a simple MD5
Checksum of the content which verifies its content is technically required for a valid
However, access to these signing tools is quite limited. They can be sometimes
expensive and using them can be difficult. While PGP can be integrated into
Microsoft Outlook and other e-mail systems for organisations, no personal e-mail
(GMail, Hotmail, Yahoo Mail, etc…) offers the facility to electronically sign e-mails.
Further to that the certification service providers (e.g. Verisign) can be held liable for
any damage done as a result of anyone relying on the signature if the provider has
acted negligently. So, if I defraud the certification service provider and obtain
hardware or software that allows me to electronically sign e-mails and documents as
Bertie Ahern, Taoiseach of Ireland; then the certification service provider is liable for
all damages caused by me with that signature.
But it gets worse. PKI can be easily broken (Breaking PKI, Dr Mike Scott).
This was known pre-2000 and the example outlined is how to break PKI using
Windows 98. So, while electronic signatures are a good idea and are now legally
binding, their implementing architecture can be easily broken. (The Emperor’s new
For some bizarre reason, the electronic commerce act 2000 also puts into place
strong laws regarding .ie domain names. In a move that would have been more at
home in communist china, that law was enacted to not allow individuals to have a .ie
domain name for personal use. So, I cannot buy http://www.RonanCrowley.ie but I
can quite easily get http://www.RonanCrowley.com from an Irish company (for 9).
To register a .ie domain, you must be able to prove a real and substantive
connection with Ireland. Usually this means providing a company registration
number, or other documentary proof of your connection to Ireland, and rights to the
name, which you wish to use. (IrishDomainNames.com). Why such a tight
restriction? There is nothing to be gained from it, apart from the Irish government
maintaining control over the Internet content delivered to the world from Ireland and
the restriction of undesirable content, surely this is a restriction on the human right of
Online fraud is a major blocking factor to electronic commerce. Many people
that have not used the Internet for purchasing products or services cite fraud
(specifically credit card fraud) as the most serious risk.
Electronic contracts, completed at time of receipt (i.e. Confirmation e-mail) do
not require a response. So when you receive an e-mail, confirming the particulars of a
contract organised previously in any manner, its safe to assume that the contract is
correct and complete. But what if the e-mail is false? If a third party sends a falsified
e-mail confirming the contract, unbeknownst to the recipient is this a valid contract?
I sent the mail below to myself (Its not difficult to fake an e-mail, using the
“Mutt” e-mail program on any Unix environment, just press Alt+F to modify the from
field before sending). It arrived seemingly from a valid e-mail address, and signed
correctly. Regular e-mail usage would indicate that the mail is correct and valid.
However, the e-mail was a forgery and as such illegal and could not have
resulted in a valid contract. But does this mean that there is a potential loophole in the
electronic commerce act? I could set up an online shop selling mobile phones (for
example), then in the very small print say that you are only buying a picture of the
mobile phone, on the final purchase page, display the picture of the phone, legal
contract complete. Then the customer gets a “confirmation” e-mail not sent by me,
but rather someone else confirming that they will receive delivery soon. But they
The electronic commerce act makes no direct provisions for this scenario.
There are no clear definitions of what terms and conditions are required to be
displayed by law for transactions. Though admittedly, this would be almost
impossible to enforce, as websites from all over the world can be used from Ireland.
At the beginning of the act, under the definition of electronic communication,
there is the stipulation that the definition “does not include information communicated
in the form of speech unless the speech is processed at its destination by an automatic
Now this is a serious over-sight for two reasons. Firstly, voice recognition
systems are notoriously difficult to implement, especially when adding any personal
verification into the service, this I know from personal experience having written one
(SVIS 2001). Secondly, and more importantly, the emergence of VOIP (Voice Over
Internet Protocol) as a communications mechanism and direct substitution for the
existing PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network, i.e. Current Eircom network)
systems means that electronically communicated speech is a service that many people
A huge amount of people are currently using Skype for their phone calls (Over
250 people have downloaded it) and more and more Irish people are replacing Eircom
with the much cheaper VOIP solution offered by Blueface. So it is no longer
appropriate to call VOIP a new or emerging technology. The fact that the electronic
commerce act categorically states that this type of communication is outside the scope
act, gives no legal standing to contracts conducted over the phone through VOIP
connections. So this would indicate that phone calls carried out over VOIP
connections are not legally binding in this state.
The Electronic commerce act 2000 is a pretty shoddy piece of legislation. It
seems to have been written without much technical knowledge or any foresight (Case
and point VOIP). The necessity for the act in the first place was the need to
categorically define electronic contracts. However, since the case of Entores Ltd Vs
Miles Far East Corporation [1955], there was already an existing provision for this in
the law. Secondly the EU directive on electronic signatures, but this has been proven
to be based on a flawed technical system. So what has the electronic commerce act
2000 given us? A little bit of restriction over the .ie domain name, and not a lot else. References
http://www.computing.dcu.ie/~mike/pki.html
http://www.irishdomains.com/WhyDotie.htm
http://www.domainregistry.ie/RegistrationPolicy.php
Speaker Verification implemented Security
http://www.redbrick.dcu.ie/~bilco/project/
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